
Decoupling at the Friend-shore
Habib William Kherbek discusses supply chain decoupling and friend-shoring in global trade.
Recently, ‘de-globalisation’ has become almost as much of a buzzword as globalisation was in its heyday.
A trend that started with concerns about globalised supply chains during the Covid pandemic went into overdrive during the (ongoing) period of economic self-harm that began with The United State’s ‘Liberation Day’ in April of 2025: decoupling. The leading economies of the world began to understand the efficacy of having direct control of fundamental industries, and the dangers of fragile, complex logistical chains. With the growing uncertainty around Trump’s economic and military adventurism, the idea of bringing economically or socially critical infrastructure and production closer to ‘home’ (re-onshoring) or relying on ‘allies’ to decouple from and to isolate adversaries (friendshoring) present an obvious immediate appeal. However the realities of geopolitics mean that these fixes can only ever be short term, frenemy shores are just as likely to emerge from the latter process as relationships of dominance and dependency emerge from moving critical projects to the territory of a country’s present-tense allies.
Re-onshoring is perhaps a more promising idea but it requires the kind of holistic thinking politicians are allergic to in Europe and the Anglosphere these days. Britain, for instance, has long imbibed the heady privatisation elixir brewed in the 1990s heyday of globalisation. Margaret Thatcher may have privatised key industries in the 1980s, but Tony Blair (and Associates) ensured these markets were even more deeply integrated into the fundaments of the state and a kind of paranoia about state provision of services took hold. Today, the UK finds itself in the perverse position of having sold off control of key industries such as transport and water to private companies, in many cases companies that are actually owned by European states. Public ownership, just not by the UK public. Europe, too, has pursued this course, if in a more cautious and measured way. Liberal parties across the continent and in the EU parliament regularly argue that the state is as much, if not more of, a problem than corporations that command resources comparable to the GDP of EU member states. This neuralgia around national ownership of infrastructure and the bugbear of the 'planned economy' - a kind of folk demon that arose during the heyday of the USSR, appear increasingly causal in the reassessment of the 1990s’ rush towards globalisation.
The past 20 years have seen a broad reaction against what are perceived to be the ‘excesses’ of a globalisation that privileged the interests of corporations over individuals. Populations, and not just the usual European/white ones, increasingly demonstrate overt hostility to the free movement of people, even when they retain a more sanguine attitude about the free movement of goods. Added to this irreducible contradiction is a robustly globalised media, which, despite the best efforts to ‘de-globalise’ and ‘friendshore’ media, remain stubbornly resistant to regulation, and far more capable of evolving to escape the regulatory formats designed to bring them under control. Social media has gone some way to correcting the worst abuses of the longstanding media monoculture. Images of African nations as perpetual laggards are now easily refuted through pushback on social media by, of all people, actual Africans. Nevertheless, the surface democratisation this offers the discourse belies a similar structural problem. Even if one grants that more voices are in the mix now, and easy stereotypes and comfortable myths no longer lie undisturbed, the same issue of media consolidation may actually be worse now than in the monoculture era. Tech CEOs such as Mark Zuckerberg, Lawrence Ellison, Sundar Pichai and emerging AI companies such as OpenAI and Anthropic are not merely major figures in the distribution of media, they are central to the creation of media, the point of entry to media, and even - in the case of AI - the creation of the facts about which publics argue.
In such an environment, it is broadly acknowledged across the political spectrum of most advanced democracies - and many retreating ones - that the current system isn’t working, in particular ‘the state’ as it has been understood and experienced in recent history isn’t working. If this is one of the few things that almost everyone across various political and national spectra can agree on; nevertheless we find ourselves returning to the more familiar, fragmented discursive geography when considering possible remedies.
First among the challenges is the eternally vexed definition of what a ‘state’ even is. Like pornography, no one can define it but everyone knows it when they see it - or at least when it comes to arrest them.
Legal minds have been thinking about the nature of a polity - if not a state - since the Bronze Age. Formal treatises about the ideal structure of such forms stretch from Hammurabi to Plato to St. Augustine in the ancient world and to Achille Mbembe and Chantal Mouffe in the contemporary world. Scholars accept that the modern state is traceable to the settlement of the Thirty Years’ War - the brutal and sanguinary conflict that created much of the enduring political geography of Central Europe - the Treaty of Westphalia, in which it was agreed that the ruler of a territory could make decisions about the cultural and religious forms that were allowed within their jurisdiction.
Later, the ideology of Romanticism solidified the already emerging relationship between conceptions of the nation and the state, and the crumbling of empires in the 20th century led to various nationalist and decolonialist (and sometimes nationalist-decolonialist) attempts to create states that were (and weren’t) recognisably Westphalian. The current widely applied definition of the state in political theory, essentially ‘a unified governing structure with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ is conveniently clear, but it doesn't match most people's lived experience of their own state.
At its most basic level, the experience of the state differs depending, as James Scott notes, whether one is a state or not. To ‘see like a state’ in Scott’s terminology is to have a certain set of prerogatives that are only ever temporarily and incompletely available to human beings. The state can see through us, but we can never see as it. Inevitably individuals, marked by race, sex, gender, ability, class, and other state-relevant characteristics, have their own understandings of how to see and be seen by the state; here one might think of the forced visibility (almost always racialised) that is imposed on prisoners, but which increasingly has been integrated into aspects of daily life as diverse as buying an electric toothbrush to reading a newspaper’s website. The discontent this engenders has taken new forms in the age of platform capitalism.
The Nobel Laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz spoke of ‘globalisation and its discontents’ - echoing Freud’s less openly ironic anatomy of the shadow side of modernity - almost two decades ago. Stiglitz was in part responding to the now-repentant Francis Fukuyama’s model of the End of History. Much as there has been a great deal of history that has never been allowed to enter History, there are many discontents that have only become visible as technologies have risen to meet them.
This dynamic cuts multiple ways. The optimistic ‘horizonatlist’ vision articulated by the Occupy! movement of 2011 was an epiphenomenon of the internet. Today’s tech broligarchy is equally digitally born. Indeed, much of the contemporary technocracy’s most inflammatory statements have concerned the nature of the state and the obligations it is due (or not).
The most high profile and articulated example of ideation about digital statecraft is Balaji Srinivasan’s manifesto The Networked State, a vision of a very different kind of social organisation where even the traditional monopoly of the use of legitimate force is, at best, optional. The rise of individuals with personal wealth that surpasses that of states has only increased in salience since Fukuyama’s time.
In the light of this intensification of shifting power between the state and its emissaries, the corporation and its board, and the philosopher CEO and their followers online, even perhaps rogue autonomous AI ‘agents’, the present moment has seen a kind of deep renegotiation of the fundamentals of the social contract; therefore ,it’s unsurprising that the nature of the state has come under intense scrutiny as a result, especially by the most and least empowered people living in them. Inevitably, this is changing the nature of how we discuss globalisation. Perhaps we can agree about the globe, but there is increasing dissensus about what the territories covering it will look like. To address these questions is impossibly urgent, as the aforementioned inequalities are creating realities that many people will not experience until decades from now.
In such a moment of uncertainty, it is less important what is predicted for the future than the terms on which that discussion is held, who is included, who is excluded, what premises are being treated as serious and which ones are dismissed? For my own part, I will be seeking to address this question in my contributions to Nuruba this season. First, it is important to consider the sites of conflict in modern state discourse. Secondly, the proposed ‘solutions’ such as the Networked State deserve scrutiny in some depth to see what does and doesn’t work about their logic. Also, the nature and application of power as a quantity is central to the formation and implementation of state prerogatives. The state is seeing us, it is perhaps past time that we start looking back.
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